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Abstract
Producers of software viewers commonly oﬀer basic versions of their products for free
while more sophisticated versions are highly priced, thereby providing less attractive or
lower valuations consumers with larger utility levels. We give some foundations to this
outcome called versioning. We consider a duopoly in which ﬁrms oﬀer diﬀerentiated goods
to a representative consumer; the buyer has distinct marginal valuations for the quality of
the products; each producer perfectly knows the consumer’s taste for its own product, but
remains uninformed about its taste for the rival’s product.
When each product cannot be purchased in isolation of the other one, a phenomenon of
endogenous preferences arises since a ﬁrm’s oﬀer to the consumer depends on the information
unknown by the rival ﬁrm. Multiple equilibria emerge and the consumer’s rent increases with
his valuation for one product and decreases with the valuation for the other product. By
contrast, when each product can be purchased in isolation of the other one, at the unique
equilibrium consumers with larger valuations for a product earn higher rents.
The analysis is undertaken under two alternative pricing policies: in the partially-discri-
minatory case, producers make use of the known information only; in the fully-discriminatory
case, each producer second-degree price discriminates the consumer according to the un-
known information. We show that, sometimes, ﬁrms prefer partial to full discrimination,
i.e., strategic ignorance of consumers’ tastes for the rival brand softens competition.
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11 Introduction
Producers of software viewers commonly oﬀer basic versions of their products for free while
more sophisticated versions are highly priced. For instance, Apple oﬀers its Quick Time Player
for free and charges $29.99 for its Quick Time Pro. Real Networks oﬀers its Real Player for
free and charges $49.99 for its Real Player Plus. Shapiro and Varian (1998) have argued that
this pricing behaviour, which they refer to as ‘versioning’, is intended to avoid competition in
a market with intense competition, high ﬁxed costs and marginal costs close to zero: without
versioning, competition would drive prices to zero, making it impossible for ﬁrms to recoup their
ﬁxed costs. In fact, versioning consists in oﬀering diﬀerent price-version pairs.
There would be nothing to add to Shapiro and Varian’s argument if the market for soft-
ware viewers was highly competitive. However, Apple, Real Networks and Microsoft (with its
free Media Player) enjoy some market power, which is actually needed to price discriminate,
even imperfectly because of incomplete information. More strikingly, it even seems that in the
versioning setting ‘low-proﬁle’ buyers, i.e., buyers who are not willing to pay much for the prod-
uct a priori, get higher surplus than the high-proﬁle buyers.1 If it is the case that low-proﬁle
users earn higher rents, then this way of making business by extracting surplus mainly from
the high-proﬁle users would stand in sharp contrast with the standard theory of second-degree
price discrimination (see, e.g., Maskin and Riley, 1984). Shapiro and Varian further argue that
‘The logic of the Free Version’ can be explained by network eﬀects, building product awareness,
or foreclosing the market. Again, although these arguments may hold (especially the network
aspect)2, they do not fully explain the features of this market.
The purpose of this paper is to explain apparently ‘odd’ features in some markets, where
the magnitude of rent extraction seems to go in the opposite sense of that predicted by the
standard theory, the market for viewers being possibly one. We build a model of oligopoly
competition under asymmetric information and price discrimination, which yields an outcome
where consumers buying the lower qualities of a product can get more surplus or less surplus
than those buying higher quality versions. As we discuss in Section 6, our analysis is closely
related to recent empirical works on competition in nonlinear pricing: our model bears some
resemblance to the structural models used in Ivaldi and Martimort (1994), who focus on the
French energy distribution market, and in Miravete and R¨ oller (2003, 2004), who focus on the
U.S. cellular telephone industry.
Our results are obtained under the following main assumptions: (i) the consumer has distinct
valuations for the imperfectly substitutable products; (ii) there exists an asymmetric information
both between ﬁrms and consumers in the market, and between competing ﬁrms themselves.
The ﬁrst assumption captures the fact that some consumers have inherent preferences over
1See Wang (2003). Of course, one cannot conclude that this is strictly the case, because consumers’ valuations
remain unobservable. However, by giving basic software for free to low-proﬁle buyers, while charging a high price
for a slightly more sophisticated one, it seems more likely, or at least possible, that the low-proﬁle users are getting
more surplus that the high-proﬁle ones.
2Parker and Van Alstyne (2000) present an analysis of two-sided competition in software markets and show
that ﬁrms might wish to distribute a software for free in order to boost the demand for complementary products.
2particular brands;3 hence, the consumer’s heterogeneity is multi-dimensional. Moreover, unlike
a CD player which can read any disc, a software viewer may not be compatible with all digital
goods. Typically over the internet, a user is required to download a given viewer (possibly for
free) if if he wants to visualize a digital good. The user who possesses only Media Player may
then be obliged to get Real Player: a user may ﬁnd it optimal to acquire both viewers. Although
for a given set of digital ﬁles, Real Player and Media Player can be viewed as substitutes, there
still is a substantial set of ﬁles for which both viewers are necessary.4 Thus, we are led to
consider two settings: when products are complements on the extensive margin5, buying one
product in isolation of the other good has no value to the consumer; by contrast, when products
are substitutes on the extensive margin, the consumer can decide to shop exclusively with one
ﬁrm.
The second assumption relates to one aspect about the market for digital goods, which can
hardly be denied: a lot more information about consumers can be collected than through the
traditional distribution channels. For example, in Shapiro and Varian (1998), we can read the
following:
Playboy, for example posts free images of its playmates on its Web site... Each
image incorporates a digital watermark, enabling Playboy to track not only how
many people view the image on its own site, but also how many people view it after
it’s been copied onto other sites. In this way, Playboy learns more about its on-
line customers and how they use its products, further strengthening its ability to
sell...on-line and print subscriptions
However, if there are other sites which oﬀer similar products to the Playboy site (and there sure
are...), Playboy may not have any idea about what the very same user who visited its site visited
in the rival’s sites. In other words, while a lot of information about a user can be collected from
a product’s own site, this information is very likely to be speciﬁc to the product. Therefore, the
market for digital goods is very likely to be characterized by information asymmetry between
ﬁrms.6 Therefore, we consider that each ﬁrm is informed on the consumer’s valuation for its
own product but remains uninformed on the buyer’s valuation for the rival good.
3In a sense, there is both horizontal and vertical diﬀerentiation in our model.
4As a matter of fact, several users have on their computers more than a viewer. One may argue that they do
so because they they were oﬀered for free (if the basic versions). However, such argument would be very doubtful
as there are hundreds of free softwares on the internet, yet users do not acquire them all, but rather those that
they need.
5This terminology is borrowed from Martimort and Stole (2003b). The case of complementarity on the ex-
tensive margin can be illustrated as follows: Operating systems and softwares are worth nothing one without the
other, but a higher quality OS can be a substitute to a lower quality software. It is also intended to characterize
diﬀerent degree of competitive pressure.
6In most markets, ﬁrms (whether selling digital or more traditional products) can acquire information in
two ways: directly, by repeated interaction (transaction or after-sale), telemarketing or direct mail survey, or
indirectly, by credit cards reports, or a marketing ﬁrm; see Liu and Serfes (2003). The indirect way allows to
acquire information about both consumer’s preferences as a ﬁrm can always buy (e.g., from a marketing ﬁrm)
information about consumer’s preferences for any product, including rival’s products. However, the direct way
allows to have information about its own product only (in the case of ﬁrms selling online, a substantial amount
of information can be collected which clearly may not say much about the consumer’s characteristics that relate
to rivals’ products). Therefore, there are information sources available to all competitors, and sources available
to single ﬁrms, which makes plausible that a ﬁrm is always more informed than its competitors about consumers’
3As concerns ﬁrms’ pricing policies, two possibilities are studied. In both cases, a ﬁrm’s
pricing policy depends on the known information: in this sense, there is always ﬁrst-degree/direct
discrimination along the known dimension of heterogeneity. In the ﬁrst case, each ﬁrm oﬀers
the same price-quality pair to consumers with diﬀerent unknown valuations: this pricing policy
consists in a mix of uniform pricing along the unknown dimension of heterogeneity and ﬁrst-
degree/direct price discrimination along the known dimension. In the second case, each ﬁrm
second-degree price discriminates the diﬀerent types of consumer along the unknown dimension
of heterogeneity; this pricing policy consists in a mix of ﬁrst-degree and second-degree/indirect
price-discrimination.7 The analysis of these forms of competition between asymmetrically un-
informed duopolists is, to the best of our knowledge, new to the literature. Strikingly, the
equilibria that emerge under the diﬀerent pricing policies bear some strong similarities.
In a ﬁrst step, we analyze the case in which the consumer can threaten each competitor to
buy only the rival’s product. Each ﬁrm therefore needs to ensure that when purchasing both
softwares, the consumer gets at least as much rent as what he could get if he were buying only the
rival product. In this setting, we obtain a unique equilibrium; consumers with larger valuations
for the products earn higher levels of surplus. Interestingly, equilibrium quality levels can be
either upwards or downwards distorted with respect to the full information benchmark.
In a second step, we analyze the setting in which the consumer either acquires both products
or none. There is now a phenomenon of endogenous preferences which can be explained as
follows: a ﬁrm’s ranking over the diﬀerent unknown types of consumer now directly depends
on the rival ﬁrm’s ﬁrm oﬀer to the consumer. Put diﬀerently, the information that a ﬁrm may
want to extract from a user (by oﬀering diﬀerent price-version pairs) depends on the oﬀer made
by the rival ﬁrm which knows this information. The rival is then in position to manipulate the
revelation of this information through its oﬀer, and this gives rise to a multiplicity of equilibria;
in each equilibrium, one ﬁrm ends up having a preference over the low type consumer8 implying
that the consumer’s surplus is increasing in his valuation for one product but decreasing in the
valuation for the other good. Therefore, in each equilibrium, one ﬁrm practices a ‘standard’
price discrimination by providing lower rents to lower types of consumer while the rival ﬁrm
does the opposite by providing lower types with more rents than the higher types. In each
equilibrium, the quality of one good is distorted upward w.r.t. the full information level whereas
the quality of the other good is distorted downward.
These results hold both when ﬁrms perform partial or full price discrimination. More pre-
cisely, the rent proﬁles are qualitatively similar under the two pricing policies but the distortions
on the quality levels are diﬀerent.
Finally, we conclude with a comparison of the two pricing policies. Full discrimination
better allows ﬁrms to extract the consumer’s rent; however, we also argue that it intensiﬁes
competition. We show that when the consumer can threaten each ﬁrm to buy only the rival
product, then ﬁrms jointly prefer to stick to partially discriminatory pricing policies. Diﬀerently
preferences for its own product. For ﬁrms selling a large part of their product online, such as softwares, this
asymmetry eﬀect may be stronger.
7The distinction between direct and indirect price discrimination is borrowed from Stole (2001).
8Similar features arise in Bond and Gresik (1997, 1998).
4stated, strategic ignorance of the consumer’s taste for the rival’s brands softens competition.
Our paper belongs to two distinct literatures. First, we borrow from the literature on com-
mon agency under adverse selection; see Martimort (1992) and Stole (1991) and more recently
Martimort and Stole (2003a). Second, our paper relates with the literature on welfare eﬀects of
uniform vs. discriminatory pricing (see, e.g., Thisse and Vives, 1988, Holmes, 1989, and Corts,
1998, among others), which is extensively surveyed in Stole (2001). We bring to that literature
a new comparison which incorporates diﬀerent forms of price discrimination simultaneously.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section, Section 2, presents the building blocks
of the model. In Section 3, we study the complete information benchmark. The partially-
discriminatory and fully-discriminatory equilibria are derived in Sections 4 and 5 respectively.
In Section 6, we compare the two pricing policies for a particular speciﬁcation of the model.
Section 7 brieﬂy concludes.
2 The Model
Consider a duopoly in which two ﬁrms (i = 1,2) sell one unit of variable quality products to
a buyer.9 The gross utility of the consumer who consumes good 1 with quality q1 and good 2
with quality q2 is given by (superscript ‘g’ stands for ‘gross’)
Ug(θ,q1,q2) ≡ u1(θ1,q1) + u2(θ2,q2) + u(q1,q2), (1)
where θ ≡ (θ1,θ2). Parameter θi relates to the consumer’s intrinsic valuation for the quality of
good i; that θi is (a priori) diﬀerent from θj simply illustrates the fact that, for equal products’
qualities, the consumer inherently has a larger preference for one good. However, the buyer’s
utility derived from the consumption of the products also depends on the attributes attached
to the diﬀerent goods, which is embodied in the quality levels. Products are assumed to be
imperfect substitutes on the intensive margin, i.e., U
g
q1q2 = uq1q2 ≤ 0, for all quality levels:
provided that the consumer buys both goods, a marginal increase in the quality of one product
reduces the marginal valuation for the other good.
The following assumptions are assumed to hold for all strictly positive consumption levels:
U
g
qi > 0, U
g
qiqi < 0, U
g
θi > 0, U
g
θiqi > 0. These conditions are interpreted as follows: for each
good, marginal utility increases with quality, but at a decreasing rate; the larger the preference
for good i is, the higher the consumer’ utility and marginal utility levels. For tractability, we





It is common knowledge that θi is independently distributed on the interval Θi ≡ [θi,θi]
9Following Maskin and Riley (1984), another interpretation is that there is a continuum of buyers and that
the taste parameters of each buyer are drawn independently from the same distribution.
10That ui(θi,0) = U
g(0,0) = 0 is assumed for analytical convenience only and does not aﬀect our results as
long as ui(θi,0) and U




qiqj|, is standard and
implies that were ﬁrms oﬀering purely linear prices the consumer’s demand function for one good would be more
sensitive to the price of that good than to the rival price.
5according to the (strictly positive) density fi(.) with c.d.f. Fi(.), i = 1,2.11 However, only the
consumer perfectly knows his valuation for both goods. As regards ﬁrms, we assume they are
asymmetrically un-informed as deﬁned next.
Deﬁnition 1. Asymmetrically un-informed duopolists: ﬁrm i is perfectly informed about θi but
only knows the distribution of θj, i 6= j, i,j = 1,2.
This information structure underlines the fundamental asymmetry between competitors: each
ﬁrm is better informed on the consumer’s marginal valuation for its product than on the con-
sumer’s valuation for the rival product.
Firm i’s proﬁt is thus deﬁned as follows
Vi = Pi − Ci(qi),
where Ci(qi) is the strictly increasing and convex cost of producing good i with quality level qi
and Pi is the price paid by the consumer to ﬁrm i.
The consumer’s net utility is the diﬀerence between his gross utility and the prices paid to
the ﬁrms,12 or
U = −P1 − P2 + Ug(θ,q1,q2).
The timing goes as follows: ﬁrst, ﬁrms make simultaneously and non-cooperatively their
oﬀers to the buyer; second, the consumer decides which oﬀers he accepts. As argued in the
Introduction, two cases are worth considering:13
• Complementarity on the extensive margin. In that case, the consumer attributes no value
to product i without the purchase of good j. For instance, when software compatibility
is very severe, the consumer prefers to acquire both softwares whatever their respective
qualities. Therefore, to ascertain that the consumer will purchase its good, ﬁrm i must
ensure that the consumer’s utility when he accepts both ﬁrms’ oﬀers is larger that his
utility if he decides to purchase none (which is normalized to 0), or
U ≥ 0. (PCI
i )
• Substitutability on the extensive margin. In that setting, the consumer has the extra










i (θ) is the consumer’s outside opportunity with respect to ﬁrm i: this represents
11Notice that considering imperfectly correlated adverse selection parameters would not qualitatively change
the main messages conveyed in this paper since this would only modify each ﬁrm’s prior on the unknown piece of
information.
12If qi = 0 then the price paid by the consumer to ﬁrm i is null.
13The cases correspond to the intrinsic and delegated common agency settings, as coined by Bernheim and
Whinston (1986).
6the consumer’s rent when he decides to buy only from the rival ﬁrm j. Notice that this
outside opportunity is endogenous since it depends on the rival ﬁrm’s oﬀer.14
3 Complete Information Benchmark
As a useful benchmark, we consider (in this section only) that both ﬁrms perfectly know con-
sumer’s preferences, i.e., θ: in that case, ﬁrms can perfectly discriminate the diﬀerent types of
buyer. In order to determine the equilibrium in terms of price and quality levels oﬀered by
the ﬁrms, we consider the most general case in which ﬁrms oﬀer the consumer price schedules
Pi(θ,qi), i = 1,2; given the information at the disposal of ﬁrm i, this schedule links for all
possible quality levels of good i chosen by the consumer the price paid by the buyer to ﬁrm i.
To determine ﬁrm i’s best-response, we take as given the price schedule oﬀered by the rival
ﬁrm to the consumer in an equilibrium. Notice that diﬀerent price schedules oﬀered by ﬁrm j
aﬀect diﬀerently the consumer’s behavior vis-` a-vis ﬁrm i. To account for this eﬀect, let us deﬁne
the consumer’s optimal quality choice for good j, and the corresponding utility level (gross of
the price paid to ﬁrm i), for a ﬁxed quality of good i as follows
ˆ qj(θ,qi) = argmax
qj
{−Pj(θj,qj) + Ug(θ,qi,qj)},
ˆ Ui(θ,qi) = max
qj
{−Pj(θj,qj) + Ug(θ,qi,qj)}.
ˆ qj(θ,qi) highlights the linkage between the consumer’s valuations for quality: a change in the
quality of one good aﬀects the consumer’s marginal utility for the other good and therefore the
level of quality of the latter product chosen by the consumer. When designing its oﬀer for the
consumer, each ﬁrm accounts for the impact of its rival’s oﬀer on the choice of quality levels by
the consumer.
Moreover, let us assume that ˆ qj(θ,qi) is characterized by the ﬁrst-order condition
−Pjqj(θ, ˆ qj(θ,qi)) + Ug
qj(θ,qi, ˆ qj(θ,qi)) = 0. (2)
For ˆ qj(θ,qi) to be indeed characterized by (2), it must be the case that the consumer’s problem
maxq1,q2{−P1(θ,q1) − P2(θ,q2) + Ug(θ,q1,q2)} is concave at equilibrium. This is checked in
Appendix A.1.
Similarly, if the consumer decides to buy only the rival product, then the quality purchased
and the corresponding outside opportunity are deﬁned as follows
qout
j (θ) = argmax
qj
{−Pj(θ,qj) + Ug(θ,qi = 0,qj)} = ˆ qj(θ,0)
Uout
i (θ) = max
qj
{−Pj(θ,qj) + Ug(θ,qi = 0,qj)} = ˆ Ui(θ,0).
14Implicit in this formulation is that a ﬁrm’s oﬀer to the consumer cannot be contingent on the consumer’s
decision to buy only the rival product. Such a contracting possibility is likely to violate antitrust rules and is
therefore discarded from our analysis.
7If the consumer decides not to acquire good i, then his marginal utility for good j increases and
he is thus willing to buy a higher quality of the latter good: therefore, ˆ qj(θ,qi) ≤ qout
j (θ). This
intuitive result is shown in Appendix A.1.
Finally, the next lemma turns out to be useful.
Lemma 1. When goods are substitutes on the intensive margin and ﬁrms compete in price
schedules, both outside opportunities are positive.
Proof. See Ivaldi and Martimort (1994).
To build the intuition, consider the extreme scenario in which products are close substitutes. In
that case, if the consumer decides not to acquire product i, then his loss of utility can be almost
fully oﬀset by increasing the level of quality chosen for good j; diﬀerently stated, the consumer
can threaten ﬁrm i to shop exclusively with its rival and derive a strictly positive utility level.
Lemma 1 shows that this reasoning holds even when products are weakly substitutable, whatever
the information at ﬁrms’ disposal.
Let us start with the case of substitutability on the extensive margin. Under complete
information, ﬁrm i’s best-response is to implement a quality level qi(θ) and a price pi(θ) =
Pi(θ,qi(θ)) which maximize its proﬁt while satisfying the corresponding consumer’s participation
constraint, or using Lemma 1
max
{qi(θ),pi(θ)}
Vi(θi,qi(θ)) s.t. U(θ) = −pi(θ) + ˆ Ui(θ,qi(θ)) ≥ Uout
i (θ).
The participation constraint must bind at equilibrium since ﬁrm i seeks to set as high a price
as possible. This deﬁnes the value of the optimal price set by ﬁrm i, or equivalently the rent
earned by the consumer
pFB
i (θ) s.t. UFB(θ) = Uout
i (θ).
Then, optimizing with respect to qi(θ) yields the following ﬁrst-order condition, which is
necessary and suﬃcient in our context,
ˆ Ui
qi(θ,qi(θ)) = Ciqi(qi(θ)). (3)
Equation (3) is a usual ‘marginal beneﬁt equals marginal cost’ rule from ﬁrm i’s perspective,
which accounts for the fact that the buyer optimally chooses his quality level of good j.
At equilibrium, consistency imposes that ˆ qj(θ,qFB
i (θ)) = qFB
j (θ) and the equilibrium quality




j (θ)) = Ciqi(qFB
i (θ)) i 6= j i,j = 1,2. (4)
Diﬀerentiating (4) w.r.t. θi and θj, we obtain that
∂qFB
i
∂θi (θ) ≥ 0 and
∂qFB
i
∂θj (θ) ≤ 0, for i,j = 1,2,
i 6= j. Intuitions are straightforward. First, the lower the consumer’s valuation θi for the quality
15To focus on the interesting cases, equilibrium qualities are assumed to be strictly positive.
8of the good produced by ﬁrm i is, the lower is ﬁrm i’s equilibrium quality level. Second, applying
a similar argument, the smaller θj is, the smaller is quality qj; such a decrease in qj leads to an
increase in qi since the marginal utility of the consumer for ﬁrm i’s good is increased.
Consider now the case of complementarity on the extensive margin. With respect to the
previous case, the unique diﬀerence is that the participation constraint becomes
U(θ) = −pi(θ) + ˆ Ui(θ,qi(θ)) ≥ 0.
Therefore, the equilibrium quality levels are not aﬀected by the level of utility that must be
given up by each ﬁrm to the consumer in order to ensure that this consumer will not shop
only with the other ﬁrm. The intuition is immediate: under full information, each ﬁrm perfectly
(ﬁrst-degree) discriminates the consumer, but might be constrained, in terms of surplus given up
to the consumer, by its competitors. The optimal way for a ﬁrm to provide the consumer with
suﬃciently high a rent to induce his participation is to reduce its price, which has a ﬁrst-order
impact of the buyer’s rent, without distorting its quality level. Under complete information
on the ﬁrms’ side, the competitive pressure which is channeled through the buyer’s outside
opportunities only leads to a reallocation of the total surplus between the consumer and the
ﬁrms.
In Appendix A.1 we show that two-part price schedules enable to decentralize the equilibrium
allocation. The variable part of the price schedule is used to provide the buyer with the correct
incentive as regards his quality decision (i.e., to internalize the cost of quality), the ﬁxed part
enables to capture as much rent as consistent with the buyer’s participation. In line with the in-
tuition, we also prove that the outside opportunity Uout
i (θ), which coincides with the consumer’s
equilibrium rent when products are substitutes on the extensive margin, is increasing with θj:
under complete information, from the viewpoint of ﬁrm i, the larger the buyer’s valuation for
the rival good is, the larger is the rent that must be given up to that consumer to prevent him
from shopping exclusively with the rival ﬁrm.
Moreover, under complete information, it is straightforward to show that the same equi-
librium allocation would emerge had we assumed that ﬁrms compete in price-quality pairs (or
singleton contracts {pi(θ),qi(θ)}, i = 1,2) instead of price schedules.
We summarize this benchmark in the next proposition.
Proposition 0. Under complete information, equilibrium quality levels are uniquely deﬁned and
are not aﬀected by the possibility for the consumer to shop exclusively with one ﬁrm. Only under
the possibility of exclusive shopping does the consumer earn a rent; this rent is increasing in his
valuations for the products.
We now come back to our initial framework in which each ﬁrm suﬀers from incomplete
information on the consumer’s valuation for the rival good. As we shall see, many of the
previously-mentioned results do not carry over to the situation of incomplete information.
94 Competition in Partially-Discriminatory Pricing
In this section, we analyze a simple form of competition in which both ﬁrms do not discriminate
the consumer along the unknown dimension of heterogeneity. Firm i being informed on the
consumer’s valuation for its own product, its oﬀer to the consumer still depends on this piece of
information. Hence, the ﬁrms’ pricing policy consists in a mix of ﬁrst-degree price discrimination
along the known dimension of the consumer’s preference and uniform pricing along the unknown
dimension: ﬁrms only partially discriminate the diﬀerent types of buyer.
Substitutability on the extensive margin. Firm i oﬀers a price-quantity pair which de-
pends only on the known information, {pi(θi),qi(θi)},16 in order to maximize its expected proﬁt
while ensuring that the buyer does not shop exclusively with its rival, or
max
{qi(θi),pi(θi)}






where the outside opportunity is now given by
Uout
i (θj) = −pj(θj) + Ug(θj,qi = 0,qj(θj)).
Again, we need to determine whether the threat to shop exclusively with the rival is credible,
i.e., if outside opportunities are positive when ﬁrms compete in partially-discriminatory pricing
policies. The following result is reminiscent of our previous analysis.
Lemma 2. When goods are substitutes on the intensive margin and ﬁrms compete in partially-
discriminatory pricing policies, both outside opportunities are positive.
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
The main diﬃculty that arises in solving ﬁrm i’s problem stems from the fact that, a priori,
ﬁrm j’s oﬀer to the consumer depends on ﬁrm i’s unknown information, θj. As we argue next,
this implies that the behavior of the consumer’s rent requires to be studied with particular at-
tention. To highlight this point, we split the ﬁrms’ optimization problem into two sub-problems:
ﬁrst, we study the duopolists’ best-responses assuming that the buyer’s rent behaves monoton-
ically w.r.t. the adverse selection parameters; second, we focus on the variation of the buyer’s
rent w.r.t. the private information parameters.
Best-responses for given indiﬀerent types. Given Lemma 2, a relevant variable in our context is
the diﬀerence between the rent U(θ) and the outside opportunity Uout
i (θj) that we call the ‘net
rent’. Indeed, assume in a ﬁrst time that ∂
∂θj[U(θ)−Uout
i (θj)] has a constant sign.17 This implies
that, from ﬁrm i’s viewpoint, there exists a type θ∗
j ∈ {θj,θj} of buyer, called the indiﬀerent type
for ﬁrm i, such that if the participation constraint is satisﬁed for this type, then it is satisﬁed
16In a sense, ﬁrm i’s oﬀer consists in a price schedule which is degenerated to a single point.
17This property is satisﬁed at equilibrium.
10for all the other types of buyer. Since ﬁrm i dislikes giving up excessive rent to the buyer, the






Two points are worth highlighting: ﬁrst, since we consider participation of all the diﬀerent types
of consumers, everything happens as if ﬁrm i was considering that the buyer is of type θ∗
j; second,
the price oﬀered by ﬁrm i is uniquely deﬁned by the binding participation constraint.
Replacing the value of pi(θi) deﬁned by (5) in ﬁrm i’s problem and optimizing with respect




j)) = Ciqi(qi(θi)). (6)




i),qj(θj)) = Cjqj(qj(θj)). (7)
Considering (6) evaluated in θi = θ∗
i and (7) in evaluated in θj = θ∗
j forms a system of two
equations, whose solution determines qi(θ∗
i) and qj(θ∗
j). Then, plugging back qi(θ∗
i) and qj(θ∗
j)
in (6) and (7) respectively, and solving this new system yields the quality proﬁles qi(θi) and
qj(θj) in the PDP equilibrium. We note that, using our assumptions, total diﬀerentiation of (6)
with respect to θi immediately yields q0
i(θi) ≥ 0 ∀θi.
The indiﬀerent types. It remains to determine θ∗
i and θ∗
j. To this purpose and to build the
intuition, let us introduce the ‘net prices’ deﬁned as follows: ˜ pi(θi) ≡ pi(θi) − ui(θi,qi(θi)),
i = 1,2. Since ﬁrm i is perfectly informed on the buyer’s valuation for its product, the part
ui(θi,qi(θi)) of the gross utility is perfectly observed by that ﬁrm and hence cannot be a source
of rent for the consumer. This is the basic motivation to focus on net prices. With this new
notations in hand, the buyer’s rent writes as U(θ) = −˜ pi(θi) − ˜ pj(θj) + u(qi(θi),qj(θj)), while
his outside opportunity becomes Uout
i (θj) = −˜ pj(θj) + u(0,qj(θj)). The binding participation
constraint (5) deﬁnes the equilibrium net price ˜ pi(θi).
Now consider a hypothetical marginal increase in the buyer’s valuation for good j. First,




Note that the increase in the net price aﬀects in a similar way the consumer’s rent and the
outside opportunity. Second, this also aﬀects the part of the buyer’s rent which cannot be
fully captured by the ﬁrm; this in turn impacts diﬀerently the buyer’s rent and his outside
opportunity since the former increases by uqj(qi(θi),qj(θj))q0
j(θj)dθj whereas the latter increases
by uqj(0,qj(θj))q0
j(θj)dθj; since products are substitutable on the intensive margin from the
consumer’s viewpoint, the former increase is weaker than the latter, thereby implying that the











uqiqj(x,qj(θj))dx ≤ 0. (8)
18The associated second-order condition is satisﬁed.
11An implication of (8) is that θ∗
i = θi; using symmetry we obtain θ∗
j = θj. Another implication









−uqiqj(x,qj(ˆ θj))dxdˆ θj. (9)
Equation (9) illustrates that the consumer derives utility from two distinct sources. The ﬁrst one
is incomplete information on the ﬁrms’ side, which prevents competitors from fully extracting
the consumer’ surplus. The second one stems from the implicit threat put by the consumer
on each of the non-cooperating ﬁrms to shop exclusively with the rival ﬁrm when products are
substitutes on the extensive margin. Firm i provides the consumer with the highest valuation
for the rival good j (i.e., θj) with a utility level equal to his outside opportunity; consumers
with lower valuations for good j earn more than their outside opportunities. But, the larger the
valuation for one product is, the larger the consumer’s rent is. Indeed, we have
∂U
∂θj








Here, competition forces ﬁrms to provide higher valuations consumer with a larger utility level.
The proﬁle of rents is illustrated in Figure 1.19
We focus now on the pattern of quality levels in a partially-discriminatory equilibrium. The
ﬁrst-order conditions (6) and (7) can be rewritten as follows
Ug
qi(θ,qi(θi),qj(θj)) − Ciqi(qi(θi)) = −
Z qj(θj)
qj(θj)
uqiqj(qi(θi),y)dy ≥ 0, (10)
Ug
qj(θ,qi(θi),qj(θj)) − Cjqj(qj(θj)) = −
Z qi(θi)
qi(θi)
uqiqj(x,qj(θj))dx ≥ 0. (11)
Equations (10) and (11) implicitly deﬁne the ﬁrms’ best-responses, denoted by Ri(qj) for ﬁrm i,
in the partially-discriminatory pricing setting. With respect to the complete information bench-
mark, where the best-responses were such that marginal utility equals marginal cost for each
product, asymmetric information implies that the best-responses curves are downward shifted.
Everything happens here as if ﬁrm i anticipates that the consumer’s valuation for product j is
given by θj; since quality levels are increasing in the consumer’s valuations, ﬁrm i anticipates
too high a quality level purchased by the consumer for product j; products being substitutes,
ﬁrm i’s quality level tends to decrease w.r.t. the full information benchmark. However, there is
a feedback eﬀect to consider in order to fully apprehend the equilibrium pattern of quality levels.
Suppose indeed that θj is close enough to θj; then ﬁrm i’s quality level is not much distorted;
suppose simultaneously that θi is close to θi; then ﬁrm j’s quality level is much distorted; since
19To draw the utility curves in Figure 1, we use the fact that at equilibrium
∂2U
∂θi∂θj (θ) ≤ 0.
12Figure 1: Rent proﬁles in the PDP equilibrium with substitutes on the extensive margin.
products are substitutes, ﬁrm i over-supplies and ﬁrm j under-supplies quality at equilibrium.
The pattern of distortion is represented graphically in Figure 2.
Summarizing, we get the following proposition.
Proposition 1. There exists a unique partially-discriminatory pricing equilibrium, with indif-
ferent types θ∗
j = θj and θ∗
i = θi. With respect to the complete information situation, there
is either over-supply of quality for one good and under-supply of quality for the other good, or
under-supply of quality for both goods; the larger the consumer’s valuation for a product is, the
higher is his rent.
For future references, in the PDP equilibrium with substitutability on the extensive margin,
consumers with higher valuations earn larger rents; w.r.t. the full information benchmark,
buyers who value much more product i than product j are oﬀered a lower quality good i and a
higher quality good j. To illustrate, consider a consumer who highly likes Real Player (from Real
Networks); this consumer purchases a sophisticated version of Real Player although incomplete
information leads to some distortion on the quality level. Because goods are substitutes on
the intensive margin, such a consumer hardly beneﬁt from acquiring at the same time the
high quality version of, say, Quick Time (from Apple). Hence, Apple has to tailor his oﬀer by
increasing the quality of its good (w.r.t. the complete information setting) to ensure that this
buyer will not use exclusively the other player. Intuitively, when goods are substitutes on the
extensive margin, so that the consumer can in equilibrium choose to get the sophisticated Real
Player only, then it becomes very costly for Apple to ‘convince’ that consumer to take even the
13Figure 2: Best-responses and the set of quality levels in the PDP equilibrium.
low quality Quick Time.
Complementarity on the extensive margin. In this setting competition is less severe since
the consumer’s outside opportunities are now null. How is the analysis aﬀected?
As previously, consider ﬁrm i and assume that the consumer’s rent behaves monotonically
w.r.t. θj. Then, we can deﬁne the indiﬀerent type θ∗
j such that the participation constraint is
exactly binding, or U(θi,θ∗
j) = −˜ pi(θi) − ˜ pj(θ∗
j) + u(qi(θi),qj(θ∗
j)) = 0. Then, we immediately
see that the ﬁrst-order condition that characterizes ﬁrm i’s optimal quality level is still given by
(6): if the indiﬀerent types were the same, then the option to shop exclusively with one of the
competitors would have no impact on the quality levels and may only lead to a reallocation of
total surplus between the consumers and the ﬁrms.
Simple computations lead to ∂
∂θjU(θ) = −˜ p0
j(θj) + uqj(qi(θi),qj(θj))q0
j(θj), which can no
longer be signed a priori: ﬁrm i’s ranking over the diﬀerent unknown types of consumer is en-
dogenous as it depends now directly on ﬁrm j’s oﬀer to the consumer. Suppose that ﬁrm i expects
that ﬁrm j’s oﬀer is such that consumer with larger valuations for product j earn smaller rents,
or ∂
∂θjU(θ) ≤ 0. Firm i’s oﬀer is then such that ˜ pi(θi) = −˜ pj(θj) + u(qi(θi),qj(θj)). Straight-
forward manipulations then show that the consumer’s rent is such that ∂
∂θiU(θ) ≥ 0; therefore,
the indiﬀerent types are either (θi,θj) or (θi,θj): multiple equilibria emerge, each equilibrium
leading to rent and quality levels which diﬀer than those obtained in the substitutability on the
extensive margin setting. In particular, adapting the previous analysis, we observe that best-
14response are shifted in opposite directions: at equilibrium, there is now over-supply of quality
for one good and under-supply for the other product. The equilibrium quality levels and rent
proﬁles in that case are represented in Figure 3 and Figure 4 respectively. Summarizing, we
Figure 3: Best-responses and the set of quality levels in the PDP equilibrium: the case of
bundling with indiﬀerent types (θi,θj) .
obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 2. When products are complements on the extensive margin, there exist two sym-
metric equilibria: one with indiﬀerent types (θi,θj), the other with indiﬀerent types (θi,θj). In
both equilibria, there is over-supply of quality for one good and under-supply for the other; the
consumer’s rent is increasing in the valuation for one good and decreasing in the valuation for
the other product.
In these equilibria, consumers who value much more one good than the other product earn
larger rents. Proposition 2 explains why a consumer may get a higher surplus by acquiring a
basic version of a product, rather than the sophisticated ones.20 This may be applied to other
markets than simply the market for software viewers. The informational asymmetry between
ﬁrms is likely to exist in many markets (see footnote 6). Within the car industry for example,
our model may explain the evidence that price markups are much lower in base models than in
models with more options (for more, see Verboven, 1999). In the same paper, a citation from
Louis Phlips concludes that ‘one has the impression that extra options are overpriced, to extract
20Remember that the quality level of good i is increasing in θi.
15Figure 4: Rent proﬁles in the PDP equilibrium with complements on the extensive margin.
the highest possible price from those who want fancy tires or extra horsepower’. Phlips seems to
suggest that consumers with preference for the basic models may actually get a higher surplus
than those who prefer the sophisticated versions.
5 Competition in Fully-Discriminatory Pricing
As regards the previous section, one may object that ﬁrms might try to better tailor their oﬀers
to the diﬀerent characteristics of the consumer. Under incomplete information, ﬁrm i can achieve
such a second-degree price discrimination by facing the consumer with a price schedule Pi(θi,qi)
such that diﬀerent types of a consumer choose diﬀerent quality levels. In that context, the ﬁrms’
pricing policy consists in a mix of ﬁrst-degree price discrimination along the known dimension
of heterogeneity and second-degree price discrimination along the unknown dimension of the
consumer’s preference: ﬁrms fully discriminate the diﬀerent types of buyers.
For a given price schedule oﬀered by ﬁrm j, there is no loss of generality in applying the
Revelation Principle21 to determine ﬁrm i’s optimal price and quality levels. However, the
consumer’s behavior and therefore his incentive vis-` a-vis ﬁrm i depend on the price schedule
oﬀered by the rival ﬁrm j. Hence, let us again deﬁne ˆ Ui(θj,qi) the indirect utility function
which gives the maximal gain of the consumer with type θ = (θi,θj) for a given consumption
level qi when that buyer chooses optimally his the quality level for product j. ˆ qj(θj,qi) is assumed
21See Green and Laﬀont (1979) or Myerson (1981) for instance.
16to be deﬁned through the following ﬁrst-order condition
−Pjqj(θj, ˆ qj) + Ug
qj(θ,qi, ˆ qj) = 0. (12)





−Pi(θi,qi) + ˆ Ui(θj,qi)
o
.
We can now apply the standard methodology22 to ﬁnd the conditions for (local) incentive com-
patibility from the viewpoint of ﬁrm i. These conditions are, as usual, expressed in terms of
rent-quality pairs instead of price-quality pairs and stated in the next lemma.
Lemma 3. A pair {U(θi,.),qi(θi,.))} satisﬁes the local incentive compatibility constraints if and






(θj,qi(θ)) = −Pjθj(θj, ˆ qj) + U
g






(θ) ≥ 0. (SOICi)
Proof. The proof is standard and hence omitted.
From (FOICi), we observe that ﬁrm i can obtain the revelation of the unknown information
only in an indirect way: the quality of its product qi does not aﬀect directly the buyer’s rent. As
in the partially-discriminatory pricing case, (FOICi) also shows that one cannot sign a priori the
derivative of the consumer’s rent w.r.t. to ﬁrm i’s unknown information θj since this derivative
depends on the endogenous price schedule oﬀered by ﬁrm j.
In order to focus on the most economically meaningful situations, we shall now make some
additional assumptions:
• The ﬁrst-order approach. As in the complete information benchmark, the determina-
tion of the fully-discriminatory pricing equilibrium assumes that the consumer’s behavior
can be characterized by the ﬁrst-order condition (12); this amounts to assuming that the
consumer’s problem is concave.
• The Spence-Mirrlees condition. As usual, the Spence-Mirrlees condition plays a cru-
cial role in determining the impact of asymmetric information on the equilibrium quality
proﬁles. This condition, which ensures that the problem faced by each ﬁrm is well-behaved,





Provided that this condition is satisﬁed, local incentive compatibility of an allocation
ensures that it is also globally incentive compatible and the local second-order condition
22See, e.g., Guesnerie and Laﬀont (1984).
17for incentive compatibility reduces to a standard monotonicity constraint on the quality
proﬁle of good i.
These assumptions on the endogenous price schedules are needed to obtain a simple characteri-
zation of the equilibrium in fully-discriminatory pricing policies. In our general setting, we have
not been able to check that they were always ascertained at equilibrium.23 It should nonetheless
be emphasized that with the particular speciﬁcation used in the next section, the necessary
conditions are indeed suﬃcient.
We now show that some important features of the PDP equilibria carry over to the FDP
equilibria. More precisely, we show that the indiﬀerent types are the same in the FDP and the
PDP equilibria.
As previously, the analysis proceeds in two steps: ﬁrst, determination of the equilibrium given
some assumptions on the behavior of the consumer’s rent w.r.t. the heterogeneity parameters;
second, determination of the indiﬀerent types.
Equilibrium quality proﬁles given the indiﬀerent types. We assume ﬁrst that the equilibrium rent
proﬁle is monotonic in the adverse selection parameters. Therefore, from the viewpoint of ﬁrm i
there exists an indiﬀerent type θ∗






j) with substitutability on the extensive margin,
0 with complementarity on the extensive margin.
Denote by ˜ θj the boundary of Θj diﬀerent from θ∗
j. In Appendix A.3, we show that the optimal
quality of product i for a given price schedule oﬀered by ﬁrm j is given by
ˆ Ui








Under our assumptions, and as in the PDP equilibrium case, the distortions on the best-responses
(and hence on the equilibrium quality proﬁles) created by asymmetric information only depend
on the indiﬀerent types.24 For further references, we note that the consumer’s rent can be
23This is symptomatic of the common agency framework. Our presumption is that as soon as one deviates
from the perfectly symmetric standard common agency framework it becomes often impossible to ensure that
these second-order conditions are satisﬁed without putting more structure on the model; this issue appears in
Laﬀont and Pouyet (2004) or Olsen and Osmundsen (2002) for instance, who assume the existence of a common
agency diﬀerentiable equilibrium and focus on necessary conditions. Since our framework is not symmetric (e.g.,
w.r.t. the adverse selection parameters), it is not surprising that we encounter the same diﬃculty. Moreover, the
equilibrium quality proﬁles are characterized by nonlinear partial diﬀerential equations, which are not amenable
to apply the methodology proposed by Martimort (1992) to check that the diﬀerent optimality conditions are
satisﬁed at equilibrium.



















∂θj (y,qi(θi,y))dy with complementarity on the extensive margin.
The indiﬀerent types with substitutability on the extensive margin. Remember that the buyer’s
outside opportunity w.r.t. ﬁrm i is deﬁned by Uout
i (θj) ≡ maxqj {−Pj(θj,qj) + Ug(θ,0,qj)} =













This implies that the indiﬀerent types are (θi,θj), as in the PDP equilibrium.
The indiﬀerent types with complementarity on the extensive margin. Using the corresponding
writing of the ﬁrm’s rent, it is immediate to show that if ∂U
∂θj(θ) ≥ 0 then it must be the case
that ∂U
∂θi(θ) ≤ 0: the indiﬀerent types are either (θi,θj) or (θi,θj).
Discussion. As shown in the previous analysis, the indiﬀerent types in the FDP equilibria are
the same as the indiﬀerent types in the corresponding PDP equilibria. The best-responses in
a FDP equilibrium are therefore shifted in the same direction than in the corresponding PDP
equilibrium. However, in terms of equilibrium quality levels, there is a diﬀerence between the
fully-discriminatory and partially-discriminatory pricing cases. Indeed, in a FDP equilibrium,
there is no distortion on the quality levels for a consumer with type (˜ θi, ˜ θj), whereas in the
PDP equilibrium, there is no distortion on the quality levels for a consumer with type (θ∗
i,θ∗
j).
Consequently, the pattern of distortions on the equilibrium quality levels in the FDP case is
‘opposite’ to the one obtained in the PDP case. To illustrate this point, let us consider two
examples:
• Buyers with large valuations for both goods. When θi and θj are high, then, as regards
the full information benchmark, there will be weak distortions on the quality levels in the
PDP case, but large downward distortions in the FDP case. A reverse conclusion in the
case the buyer has low valuations for both products.
• Buyers with a large valuation for one product and a low valuation for the other good.
Consider for instance that θi is low and θj is large. In the PDP equilibrium, the quality
of good i is distorted upwards whereas the quality of product j is distorted downwards; in
the corresponding FDP equilibrium, the reverse holds.
196 Comparisons of Pricing Policies
In this section, we perform a welfare analysis of the diﬀerent equilibria. In order to derive
explicit solutions, we use a quadratic speciﬁcation of the consumer’s gross utility function25,
quadratic and identical cost functions26 and assume that the adverse selection parameters are
uniformly distributed on their respective support. Computing the equilibrium quality and price
levels is straightforward in a PDP equilibrium. However, it becomes more involved in a FDP
equilibrium; in that case, we focus attention on solutions of the nonlinear partial diﬀerential
equations which are linear in the adverse selection parameters. The determination of the price
schedules is not inherently diﬃcult but requires to perform cumbersome calculus that will not
be detailed here.27
To make sensible comparisons, we compute the expected welfare, ﬁrm’s proﬁt and consumer’s
rent, where the expectation is taken over both adverse selection parameters. Before presenting
our results, let us emphasize that the PDP and the FDP equilibrium perfectly coincide when
goods are independent from the consumer’s viewpoint (i.e., when U
g
q1q2 = 0). Indeed, in that
case ﬁrm i cannot aﬀect the consumer’s incentive to reveal θj since the choices of qi and qj are
independent.
Result 1. With substitutability on the extensive margin, from the ﬁrms’ viewpoint, partially-
discriminatory pricing dominates fully-discriminatory pricing.
To trace out fully the origin of this result, it is worth mentioning that in both equilibria the proﬁt
of each ﬁrm (gross of the quality cost) can be decomposed into two parts. The ﬁrst (positive)
part corresponds to the standard surplus extracted from the consumer (modulo the information
rent given up to that consumer for incentive reason) and the second (negative) part corresponds
to the outside opportunity of consumers which has to be given up by the ﬁrm.
Fully-discriminatory pricing enable ﬁrms to ﬁnely tailor their oﬀers to the characteristics of
the buyer. Hence, discriminatory pricing performs better in extracting surplus from the diﬀerent
types of consumer. However, discriminatory pricing also triggers an intense competition between
ﬁrms, which provides the consumer with higher outside opportunities, thereby leading to higher
equilibrium rents. As said earlier, the ‘threat’ to consume only one good is credible and a
uniform pricing strategy turns out to be preferred by ﬁrms. Although it may appear at ﬁrst
sight ineﬃcient, the decision not to tailor oﬀers to both consumer’s characteristics allows the
duopolists to somehow refrain themselves from competing: Strategic ignorance of consumer’s
taste for the rival’s brand softens competition!
Finally, Result 1 is also in the spirit of those obtained in the literature on price discrimination
under complete information (e.g., Thisse and Vives, 1988, Holmes, 1989, and Corts, 1998, among
others). In these papers, uniform pricing may dominate third-degree price discrimination. Our










2−λq1q2 with λ ∈ (−1,0]. See Ivaldi and Martimort (1994) or Miravete





i , i = 1,2.
27These computations are available at the following url: http://www.enpc.fr/ceras/pouyet/working_papers.
htm.
20by arguing that partial discrimination dominates full discrimination when the consumer can
threaten each ﬁrm not to consume its good.
Besides, Result 1 has also some empirical implications. Indeed, it argues, ﬁrst, that the
‘nature’ of asymmetric information (i.e., whether ﬁrms are symmetrically or asymmetrically un-
informed) is important and should be tested and, second, that attention should not be restricted
exclusively to nonlinear tariﬀs since ‘simpler contracts’ might be used by ﬁrms.
For instance, Miravete and R¨ oller (2003, 2004) consider competition in the cellular telephone
industry; their structural model follows the lines of Ivaldi and Martimort (1994) and therefore
is identical to our model except that ﬁrms are un-informed about both private information pa-
rameters; however, they also consider that ﬁrms have a priori diﬀerent knowledge about the
consumer’s characteristics and argue that one possible reason is that a ﬁrm has a better knowl-
edge than its rival about some of the consumer’s characteristics. Ivaldi and Martimort (1994)
focus on the French energy distribution market; analyzing the data, they argue that asymmetric
information is multi-dimensional but that “there is not too much asymmetric information” (p.
96) and that there is evidence of discrimination between groups of buyers; moreover, they argue
that an energy supplier usually observes the technology used by a client and therefore might be
informed on the client’s willingness-to-pay for its energy. This suggests that in these contexts it
would be relevant to test the nature of incomplete information.
Moreover, these papers focus mainly on nonlinear price schedules. Our analysis suggests
that simpler contracts can emerge as a strategic response in a competitive environment when
consumers have the option to shop exclusively with one competitors at equilibrium. This may
explain why fully nonlinear tariﬀs are seldom observed in practice.28
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we have developed a model which allows to explain situations in which competing
ﬁrms price-discriminate, yet sometimes provide lower valuations consumers with higher utility
levels. Our model also oﬀers a rich environment that incorporates both direct and indirect price
discrimination and that could serve as a building block for more applied work.
Some interesting questions have been left aside. For instance, we have assumed that ﬁrms can
credibly commit to a partially-discriminatory pricing policy. It would be worth investigating if
ﬁrms manage to reach their preferred outcome when they can choose (prior to the competition
stage) either to discriminate or not. In the same vein, if ﬁrms are able to credibly disclose
their information to their competitors prior the competition stage, it would be interesting to
study whether they decide to share their information of if some prisoner’s dilemma occurs at
equilibrium.
Recent research in mechanism design has started to examine the impact of information shar-
ing between principals. In a setting with one informed and one uninformed principals, Bond and
28Miravete (2004) considers a monopoly under incomplete information and argues that the ﬁrm should use
‘simple’ mechanisms since the gains to oﬀer fully discriminatory contracts are negligible. Our model shows that a
qualitatively similar result holds in a competitive environment under certain conditions, but for diﬀerent reasons.
21Gresik (1998) show that the possibility for the informed principal to communicate his informa-
tion to the uninformed principal leads to no eﬀective information transmission at equilibrium.29
In a sequential common agency context, Calzolari and Pavan (2004) study the possibility for the
ﬁrst-mover principal to disclose the information learned from contracting with the agent to the
last-mover principal and show that, under certain conditions, information transmission between
principals occurs at equilibrium. Coming back to our setting of asymmetrically un-informed
principals, it would be worth investigating the possibility for one principal to extract the piece
of information commonly known by the rival principal and the agent through, for instance,
Maskinian mechanisms.30
These extensions are left for future research.
A Appendix
A.1 The Complete Information Equilibrium
Determination of the Equilibrium Price Schedules. Let us start with the case of sub-
stitutability on the extensive margin. Consider that ﬁrms oﬀer price schedules of the form
Pi(θ,qi) = γi(θ) + ˜ Pi(θ,qi). In order to provide the consumer with the correct incentive, ﬁrm
i should oﬀer a two-part tariﬀ with the variable part equal to the marginal cost corresponding
to the equilibrium quality level: ˜ Pi(θ,qi) = Ciqi(qFB
i (θ)) × qi. Let consider the determination
of the ﬁxed part. Using the fact that, ﬁrst, outside opportunities are positive and, second, that









− ˜ Pj(θ,qj) + Ug(θ,qi = 0,qj)
o
.
In the case of complementarity on the extensive margin, only the sum of the ﬁxed part of
the price schedules is determined at equilibrium.
The Validity of the First-Order Approach The consumer’s problem is
max
q1,q2
−P1(θ,q1) − P2(θ,q2) + Ug(θ,q1,q2).
Since ﬁrms’ equilibrium price schedules consist in two-part prices schedules, it is immediate to
check that this problem is locally and globally concave.
29More precisely, they show that the most eﬃcient equilibrium when principals can communicate is equivalent
to a pooling equilibrium that emerges in the game with no direct communication between principals.
30See Maskin (1979).
22Behavior of the Outside Opportunities. We can rewrite the outside opportunities as
follows
Uout
i (θj) ≡ −γj(θ) + max
qj
n











− ˜ P1(θ,q1) − ˜ P2(θ,q2) + Ug(θ,q1,q2)
o
.
Therefore, we obtain the following expression of the derivative of the outside opportunity w.r.t.














































Under our assumptions the terms in the ﬁrst and the second integral are positive. Finally,
notice that by construction, we have qFB
j = ˆ qj(θ,qFB
j (θ)) and qout
j = ˆ qj(θ,0). Diﬀerentiating
(12) w.r.t. qi and using the fact that the consumer’s problem is concave, we immediately obtain
that ∂ˆ qj/∂qi ≤ 0, thereby implying that qout
j ≥ qFB
j . This ﬁnally enables to conclude that
∂Uout
i (θj)/∂θj ≥ 0.
A.2 Proof of Lemma 2
We adapt the proof of Ivaldi and Martimort (1994) to the PDP equilibrium.
First, consider that both outside opportunities strictly negative at equilibrium. Then we
have −pi(θi) + ui(θi,qi(θi)) + u(0,qi(θi)) < 0 for i = 1,2, implying that −p1(θ1) − p2(θ2) +
u1(θ1,q1(θ1)) + u2(θ2,q2(θ2)) + u(0,q2(θ2)) + u(q1(θ1),0) < 0. With demand substitutes, the
following inequality holds: u(q1(θ1),0) + u(0,q2(θ2)) > u(0,0) + u(q1(θ1),q2(θ2)), implying in
turn that the equilibrium rent of the agent must be strictly negative, a contradiction.
Second, consider that goods are substitutes and that Uout
2 (θ1) > 0. Since the net rent is
decreasing in θ1, we have U(θ1,θ2) = Uout
2 (θ1), or p2(θ2) = u2(θ2,q2(θ2)) + u(q1(θ1),q2(θ2)) −
u(q1(θ1),0). Then, simple manipulations show that Uout






Third, consider that goods are complements and that Uout
2 (θ1) > 0. Since the net rent is
increasing in θ1, we have U(θ1,θ2) = Uout
2 (θ1), or p2(θ2) = u2(θ2,q2(θ2)) + u(q1(θ1),q2(θ2)) −
u(q1(θ1),0). Then, simple manipulations show that Uout






23A.3 The Fully Discriminatory Pricing Equilibrium
The Hamiltonian associated to ﬁrm i’s problem is
Hi = fj(θj)
n






where µj(θj) is the co-state variable. Since there is no transversality condition in θj = ˜ θj, we
have µj(˜ θj) = 0. The Maximum Principle implies that −∂Hi




fj(x)dx. Then, optimizing w.r.t. the control variable qi(θ), we obtain (13).
We can even further simplify (13). At equilibrium, consistency imposes that ˆ qj(θj,qi(θ)) =
qj(θ); therefore, the equilibrium consumption proﬁles satisfy the following relations
−Pjqj(θj,qj(θ)) + Ug
qj(θi,θj,qi(θ),qj(θ)) = 0. (14)
Diﬀerentiation of (14) w.r.t. θi and θj enables to simplify (13) as follows (we omit arguments
for simplicity)
Ug
















with initial conditions qi(θi, ˜ θj) = qFB
i (θi, ˜ θj).
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